When the US-backed government collapsed in August 2021, Afghanistan’s telecom sector entered an abrupt period of uncertainty. Two decades of investment had created one of the country’s few nationwide infrastructures. The expectation in many quarters was that this would quickly deteriorate. In reality, that collapse never fully materialised.
Instead, Afghanistan’s mobile sector has settled into something more complex. Networks remain operational and coverage remains relatively broad, but the conditions under which they function have fundamentally changed.
Afghanistan’s telecom market was never a typical emerging market success story. It was built during conflict, shaped by risk, and sustained by a combination of private capital and international donor support.
Operators including Afghan Wireless, Roshan, Etisalat Afghanistan, MTN Group and Afghan Telecom expanded aggressively through the 2000s and 2010s. By the time of the US withdrawal, population coverage had reached close to ninety percent by many estimates, supported by several thousand towers and a growing fibre backbone.
This expansion created a rare outcome in Afghanistan’s infrastructure landscape. Mobile connectivity became both widely available and economically indispensable.
The latest dataset from GSMA Intelligence offers a useful snapshot of where the market stands now.
At the end of 2025, Afghanistan had approximately 22.4 million cellular mobile connections. This is not the same as unique users, as many individuals maintain multiple SIMs for cost, coverage, or work-related reasons. Even so, overall penetration remains relatively modest.
Mobile connections were equivalent to around 50.7 percent of the total population in October 2025. This places Afghanistan well below saturation levels seen in more developed markets, and also below many regional peers.
Growth has slowed significantly. Between the end of 2024 and the end of 2025, the total number of connections increased by only around 101 thousand, representing growth of roughly 0.5 percent. In practical terms, the market is approaching stagnation.
At the same time, the technological profile of the market continues to improve. Around 84 percent of connections are now classified as broadband, meaning they operate on 3G or 4G networks. This reflects years of network upgrades and spectrum investment.
However, this figure requires careful interpretation. A broadband-capable SIM does not necessarily translate into active mobile internet usage. Many users remain on low-cost plans focused on voice and SMS, even if their device and network technically support data.
The result is a market where infrastructure capability has advanced faster than actual digital adoption.
The main mobile operators in Afghanistan as of early 2026 are Afghan Wireless (AWCC), Roshan, Etisalat Afghanistan, MTN Afghanistan, now in transition to ATOMA, and Afghan Telecom’s Salaam Network.
Reliable operator level data is scarce, but a composite view from industry reports and historical benchmarks provides a reasonable indication of market structure. These estimates should be treated as indicative rather than precise.
Roshan remains the leading player, with an estimated share in the range of 35 to 45 percent. Etisalat Afghanistan follows with roughly 25 to 30 percent. Afghan Wireless is typically placed in the 15 to 25 percent range, while the former MTN operation accounts for around 10 to 20 percent. Afghan Telecom and its Salaam brand hold a smaller share, generally below 10 percent.
This distribution reflects a gradual shift over time. Earlier in the market’s development, shares were more evenly balanced. The exit of MTN Group and the ongoing transition to ATOMA have weakened the middle tier and reinforced the position of the leading operators.
What emerges is a structure defined less by intense competition and more by relative stability at the top and fragmentation below.
Each operator occupies a distinct role within this environment.
Roshan continues to act as the reference network. Its scale, investment history, and balanced urban and rural footprint allow it to maintain leadership even in a constrained economic environment. They have over 6.5 million active subscribers across all 34 provinces. Founded in 2003, it is the country's single largest private investor and taxpayer. Their network covers over 387 districts, cities, and towns, reaching approximately 91% of the population. It offers 2G, 3G, and high-speed 4G LTE services.
Etisalat Afghanistan has strengthened its position in urban markets. Its focus on data services and higher value customers reflects a broader shift in where telecom value is generated, particularly as disposable income becomes more concentrated in cities. Launched in August 2007, since then the operator has invested more than $400 Million in Afghanistan and revenue growth has doubled every year. They claim to be the fastest-growing mobile phone company in Afghanistan. Etisalat is providing voice and data services in 34 provinces and 182 districts with more than 12,000 retail outlets. It was the first operator to introduce eSIM technology in Afghanistan, allowing users to switch accounts without physical SIM cards.
Afghan Wireless retains importance through its extensive rural coverage. In many less accessible areas, it effectively functions as the backbone of connectivity, even if its commercial share is lower than the leading operators. It operates a nationwide network providing 4G LTE, 3.75G+, 3G, and 2G services, to approximately 5 million subscribers across all 34 provinces.
ATOMA, following the exit of MTN Group, represents a disrupted middle tier. While it inherits infrastructure and spectrum, it does not automatically inherit customer trust or brand strength. Its long term position remains uncertain.
Afghan Telecom (Salaam Network) operates on a different axis. Its market share is limited, but its strategic importance has increased significantly. As a state linked operator, it plays a central role in infrastructure, rural coverage obligations, and increasingly, sector oversight.
However the growing use of shutdowns and network restrictions by the Taliban has introduced a new and defining constraint on Afghanistan’s telecom sector. The nationwide disruption in September 2025, which saw fibre links deliberately cut and connectivity fall to a fraction of normal levels, demonstrated how quickly both internet and mobile services can be curtailed through centralised infrastructure control.
Reporting from The Guardian described a near total communications blackout in which mobile and internet services were effectively disabled across the country, disrupting everything from banking to basic communications . These interventions have immediate economic and social consequences, but more importantly they redefine the sector’s risk profile. Network performance is no longer determined primarily by coverage, investment, or spectrum, but by political discretion.
For operators, this complicates long-term planning and weakens incentives to invest. For users, it turns connectivity into something conditional rather than guaranteed.
In that sense, the central challenge facing Afghanistan’s mobile market is no longer how to extend networks, but how to operate them in an environment where they can be partially or entirely switched off at any time.
